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Abstract. Recently, authors have proposed under-approximate logics
for reasoning about programs. So far, all such logics have been confined
to reasoning about individual program behaviours. Yet there exist many
over-approximate relational logics for reasoning about pairs of programs
and relating their behaviours.
We present the first under-approximate relational logic, for the simple
imperative language IMP. We prove our logic is both sound and complete.
Additionally, we show how reasoning in this logic can be decomposed into
non-relational reasoning in an under-approximate Hoare logic, mirroring
Beringer’s result for over-approximate relational logics. We illustrate the
application of our logic on some small examples in which we provably
demonstrate the presence of insecurity.
1 Introduction
Almost all program logics are over-approximate, in that they reason about
an over-approximation of program behaviour. Recently, authors have proposed
under-approximate logics [16,8], for their promise to increase the scalability of
reasoning methods, avoid false positives, and provably detect bugs.
So far, all such logics have been confined to reasoning about individual pro-
gram executions. Yet, many properties of interest talk about pairs of program
behaviours. Examples are security properties like noninterference [11], but also
function sensitivity, determinism, correct implementation (refinement) and pro-
gram equivalence. Such properties can be reasoned about using relational log-
ics [5], in which pre- and post-conditions are relations on program states. Over-
approximate relational logics for doing so have been well-studied [5,4,10,12].
Here, we present (Section 2) the first under-approximate relational logic, for
the simple imperative language IMP [14]. We prove our logic is both sound and
complete (Section 3). Additionally (Section 4), we show how reasoning in this
logic can be decomposed into non-relational reasoning in an under-approximate
Hoare logic, mirroring Beringer’s result for over-approximate relational logics [6].
Under-approximate logics are powerful for provably demonstrating the presence
of bugs. We illustrate the application of our logic on some small examples (Sec-
tion 5) for provably demonstrating violations of noninterference security. In this
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sense, our logic can be seen as the first insecurity logic. However, being a gen-
eral relational logic, it should be equally applicable for provably demonstrating
violations of the other aforementioned relational properties. All results in this
paper have been mechanised in Isabelle/HOL [15].
2 The Logic
2.1 The Language IMP
Our logic is defined for the simple imperative language IMP [14]. Commands c
in IMP include variable assignment, sequencing, conditionals (if-then-else state-
ments), iteration (while-loops), and the no-op skip.
c ::= x := e | c; c | if b then c else c | while b do c | skip
Here, e and b denote respectively (integer) arithmetic and boolean expressions.
The big-step semantics of IMP is entirely standard (omitted for brevity) and
defines its semantics over states s that map variables x to (integer) values. It is
characterised by the judgement (c, s)⇒ s′ which denotes that command c when
execute in initial state s terminates in state s′.
2.2 Under-Approximate Relational Validity
Relations R are binary relations on states. We write R(s, s′) when states s and s′
are related by R.
Given pre- and post-relations R and S and commands c and c′, under-
approximate relational validity is denoted  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 and is defined analo-
gously to its Hoare logic counterpart [8,16].
Definition 1 (Under-Approximate Relational Validity).
 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 ≡ (∀ t t′. S(t, t′) =⇒ (∃ s s′. R(s, s′)∧ (c, s)⇒ t∧ (c′, s′)⇒ t′))
It requires that for all final states t and t′ in S, there exists pre-states s and s′
in R for which executing c and c′ from each respectively terminates in t and t′.
2.3 Proof Rules
Judgements of the logic are written ` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉. Fig. 1 depicts the rules of the
logic. For ` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 we define a set of rules for each command c. Almost all
of these rules has a counterpart in under-approximate Hoare logic [16,8]. There
are also three additional rules (Conseq, Disj, and Sym). Of these, only the final
one Sym does not have a counterpart in prior under-approximate logics.
The Skip rule simply encodes the meaning of  〈R〉 skip, c′ 〈S〉 in the
premise. The Seq rule essentially encodes the intuition that  〈R〉 (c; d), c′ 〈S〉
holds precisely when  〈R〉 (c; d), (c′; skip) 〈S〉 does. However we can also view
this rule differently: once c1 and c
′ have both been executed, the left-hand side
2
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still has c2 to execute; however the right-hand side is done, represented by skip.
The relation S then serves as a witness for linking the two steps together.
This same pattern is seen in the other rules too: given the pre-relation R
the Assign rule essentially computes the witness relation R[x := e] that holds
following the assignment x := e, which (like the corresponding rule in [16])
simply applies the strongest-postcondition predicate transformer to R.
The rules for if-statements, IfTrue and IfFalse, are the relational ana-
logues of the corresponding rules from under-approximate Hoare logic. The
rules WhileTrue and WhileFalse encode the branching structure of unfold-
ing a while-loop. The rule Back-Var is the analogue of the “backwards variant”
iteration rule from [16,8]. Here R is a family of relations indexed by natural num-
ber n (which can be thought of as an iteration count) such that the corresponding
relation R(k) must hold after the kth iteration. Unlike the corresponding rule
in [16], this rule explicitly encodes that the loop executes for some number of
times (possibly 0) to reach a frontier, at which point ∃ n. R(n) holds and the
remainder of the loop is related to command c′.
The Conseq and Disj rules are the relational analogues of their counterparts
in [16]. Finally, the Sym rule allows to flip the order of c and c′ when reasoning
about ` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 so long as the relations are flipped accordingly, denoted ↔R
etc. Naturally, this rule is necessary for the logic to be complete.
3 Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 1 (Soundness). For relations R and S and commands c and c′, if
` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 then  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉.
Proof. By structural induction on ` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉. Almost all cases are straight-
forward. The only exception is the Back-Var rule, which, similarly to [16],
requires an induction on the argument n to R(n) and generalising the result
from R(0) to some R(k) to get a sufficiently strong induction hypothesis.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). For relations R and S and commands c and c′,
if  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 then ` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉.
Proof. By induction on c. This proof follows a similar structure to the complete-
ness proof of [16].
4 Under-Approximate Relational Decomposition
For over-approximate relational logic, Beringer [6] showed how one can decom-
pose relational reasoning into over-approximate Hoare logic reasoning. We show
that the same is true for under-approximate relational logic, in which relational
reasoning can be decomposed into under-approximate Hoare logic reasoning.
The essence of the approach is to decompose  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 into two state-
ments: one about c and the other about c′.  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 says that for every
3
Draft: March 11 2020
∀ t t′. S(t, t′) =⇒ ∃s′. R(t, s′) ∧ (c′, s′)⇒ t′
` 〈R〉 skip, c′ 〈S〉 Skip
` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 ` 〈S〉 d, skip 〈T 〉
` 〈R〉 (c; d), c′ 〈T 〉 Seq1
` 〈R[x := e]〉 skip, c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R〉 x := e, c′ 〈S〉 Assign
` 〈R ∧ b1〉 c1, c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R〉 if b then c1 else c2, c′ 〈S〉 IfTrue
` 〈R ∧ ¬b1〉 c2, c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R〉 if b then c1 else c2, c′ 〈S〉 IfFalse
` 〈R ∧ ¬b1〉 skip, c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R〉 while b do c, c′ 〈S〉WhileFalse
` 〈R ∧ b1〉 (c; while b do c), c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R〉 while b do c, c′ 〈S〉 WhileTrue
∀ n. ` 〈R(n) ∧ b1〉 c, skip 〈R(n+ 1)〉 ` 〈∃ n. R(n)〉 while b do c, c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R(0)〉 while b do c, c′ 〈S〉 Back-Var
R1 =⇒ R2 ` 〈R1〉 c, c′ 〈S1〉 S2 =⇒ S1
` 〈R2〉 c, c′ 〈S2〉 Conseq
` 〈R1〉 c, c′ 〈S1〉 ` 〈R2〉 c, c′ 〈S2〉
` 〈R1 ∨R2〉 c, c′ 〈S1 ∨ S2〉 Disj
` 〈↔R〉 c′, c 〈
↔
S 〉
` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 Sym
Fig. 1. Proof rules. R[x:=e] denotes the transformer on relation R following the assign-
ment x := e. It is defined as: R[x := e] ≡ λ s s′. ∃ v. R(s(x := v), s′)∧s(x) = [e]s(x:=v).
Logical operators ∧ and ∨ are lifted to relations, e.g.: R∧S ≡ λ s s′. R(s, s′)∧S(s, s′).
For boolean expression b, b1 ≡ λ s s′. [b]s. Also, ∃ n. R(n) ≡ λ s s′. ∃ n. R(n)(s, s′).
R =⇒ S denotes when relation R is a subset of relation S. Finally, ↔R ≡ λ s s′. R(s′, s).
4
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S-pair of final states t and t′, we can find an R-pair of states s and s′ from which t
and t′ can be reached respectively by executing c and c′. To decompose this we
think about what it would mean to first execute c on its own. At this point we
would have reached a state t which has a c-predecessor s for which R(s, s′), and
the execution of c′ would not yet have begun and would still be in the state s′
which has a c′-successor t′ for which S(t, t′). We write decomp(R, c, c′, S) that
defines this relation that holds between t and s′:
decomp(R, c, c′, S)(t, s′) ≡ ∃ s t′. P (s, s′) ∧ (c, s)⇒ t ∧ (c′, s′)⇒ t′ ∧Q(t, t′)
This allows us to decompose  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 into two separate relational
statements about c and c′. Here we use skip to indicate when one command
executes but the other does not make a corresponding step, to simulate the idea
that first c executes followed by c′.
Lemma 1 (Relational Validity Decomposition). For relations R and S
and commands c and c′,
 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 ⇐⇒
(
 〈R〉 c, skip 〈decomp(R, c, c′, S)〉 ∧
 〈decomp(R, c, c′, S)〉 skip, c′ 〈S〉
)
Proof. From the definitions of  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 and decomp(R, c, c′, S).
Now  〈R〉 c, skip 〈S〉 talks about only one execution (since the second
command skip doesn’t execute by definition). And indeed it can be expressed
equivalently as a statement in under-approximate Hoare logic.
For Hoare logic pre- and post-conditions P and Q and command c, we write
〈P 〉 c 〈Q〉 to mean that Q under-approximates the post-states t that c can reach
beginning from a P -pre-state s [8,16].
Definition 2 (Under-approximate Hoare logic validity).
〈P 〉 c 〈Q〉 ≡ (∀ t. Q(t) =⇒ (∃ s. P (s) ∧ (c, s)⇒ t))
Then the following result is a trivial consequence:
Lemma 2.
 〈R〉 skip, c′ 〈Q〉 ⇐⇒ (∀ t. 〈R(t)〉 c′ 〈S(t)〉)
Theorem 3 below follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. It
states how every under-approximate relational statement  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 can be
decomposed into two under-approximate Hoare logic statements: one about c
and the other about c′.
Theorem 3. Under-Approximate Relational Decomposition
 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 if and only if(∀ t′. 〈(λ t. R(t, t′))〉 c 〈(λ t. decomp(R, c, c′, S)(t, t′))〉 ∧
∀ t. 〈decomp(R, c, c′, S)(t)〉 c′ 〈Q(t)〉
)
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This theorem implies that, just as over-approximate Hoare logic can be used
to prove over-approximate relational properties [6], all valid under-approximate
relational properties can be proved using (sound and complete) under-approximate
Hoare logic reasoning. This theorem therefore provides strong evidence for the
applicability of under-approximate reasoning methods (such as under-approximate
symbolic execution) for proving under-approximate relational properties, includ-
ing e.g. via product program constructions [3,1,2,9].
5 Using the Logic
While the logic is complete, its rules on their own are inconvenient for reasoning
about common relational properties. Indeed, often when reasoning in relational
logics one is reasoning about two very similar programs c and c′. For instance,
when proving noninterference [11] c and c′ might be identical, differing only
when the program branches on secret data [13]. When proving refinement from
an abstract program c to a concrete program c′, the two may often have similar
structure [7]. Hence for the logic to be usable one can derive familiar-looking
proof rules that talk about similar programs.
5.1 Deriving Proof Rules via Soundness and Completeness
For instance, the following rule is typical of relational logics (both over- and
under-approximate) for decomposing matched sequential composition.
` 〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 ` 〈S〉 d, d′ 〈T 〉
` 〈R〉 (c; d), (c′; d′) 〈T 〉 Seq-Matched
Rather than appealing to the rules of Fig. 1, this rule is simpler to derive
from the corresponding property on under-approximate relational validity. In
particular, it is straightforward to prove from Definition 1 and the big-step se-
mantics of IMP that when  〈R〉 c, c′ 〈S〉 and  〈S〉 d, d′ 〈T 〉 hold, then
 〈R〉 (c; d), (c′; d′) 〈T 〉 follows. The proof rule above is then a trivial conse-
quence of soundness and completeness.
Other such rules that we have also proved by appealing to corresponding
properties of under-approximate relational validity with soundness and com-
pleteness include the following one for reasoning about matched while-loops.
∀ n. ` 〈R(n) ∧ b1 ∧ b′2〉 c, c′ 〈R(n+ 1)〉
` 〈∃ n. R(n)〉 while b do c, while b′ do c′ 〈S〉
` 〈R(0)〉 while b do c, while b′ do c′ 〈S〉 Back-Var-Matched
6
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5.2 Derived Proof Rules
Other rules for matched programs are more easily derived by direct appeal to
existing proof rules. For instance, the following rule for matched assignments
can be derived straightforwardly from Assign and Sym.
` 〈R〉 x := e, x′ := e′ 〈R[x := e][x′ := e′]〉Assign-Matched
Similarly the following rule follows fromBack-Var-Matched above, withWhile-
False and Sym.
∀ n. ` 〈R(n) ∧ b1 ∧ b′2〉 c, c′ 〈R(n+ 1)〉
` 〈R(0)〉 while b do c, while b′ do c′ 〈∃ n. R(n) ∧ ¬b1 ∧ ¬b′2〉Back-Var-Matched2
It is useful for reasoning past two matched loops (rather than for detecting viola-
tions of relational validity within their bodies) and is an almost direct relational
analogue of the backwards variant rule from [16].
5.3 Examples
We illustrate the logic on a few small examples. Each of these examples concerns
the relational property of noninterference [11]. Under-approximate logics are
aimed to prove the existence of bugs rather than to prove their absence [16].
Each example has a security bug that violates noninterference that we provably
demonstrate via our logic.
In a programming language-based setting [18], termination-insensitive non-
interference holds for a program c if, when we execute it from two initial states s
and s′ that agree on the value of all public (aka “low”) variables, then whenever
both executions terminate the resulting states t and t′ must also agree on the
values of all public variables.
Taking the variable low to be the only public variable, we can define when
two states agree on the value of all public variables, written L, as follows:
L(s, s′) ≡ (s(low) = s′(low))
Then a program c is insecure if it has two executions beginning in states s and s′
for which L(s, s′) that terminate in states t and t′ for which ¬L(t, t′). This holds
precisely when there exists some non-empty relation S, for which
S =⇒ ¬L and  〈L〉 c, c 〈S〉
In fact, since our logic is sound, if we can prove ` 〈L〉 c, c 〈S〉 for some satisfiable
S such that S =⇒ ¬L, then the program must be insecure.
The left program in Fig. 2 is trivially insecure and this is demonstrated
straightforwardly by using a derived proof rule (omitted for brevity) for matching
if-statements that follows the then-branch of the first and the else-branch of the
second, and then by applying the matched assignment rule Assign-Matched.
7
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1 if x > 0
2 low := 1
3 else
4 low := 0
1 x := 0;
2 while n > 0 do
3 x := x + n;
4 n := y ;
5 if x = 2000000
6 low := high
7 else
8 skip
1 x := 0;
2 while x < 4000000 do
3 x := x + 1;
4 if x = 2000000
5 low := high
6 else
7 skip
Fig. 2. Examples (some inspired from [16]).
The middle program of Fig. 2 is also insecure, and is inspired by the client0
example of [16]. To prove it insecure, we first use the consequence rule to
strengthen the pre-relation to one that ensures that the values of the high variable
in both states are distinct. We use the matched assignment and sequencing rules,
Assign-Matched and Seq-Matched. Then we apply some derived proof rules
(omitted) for matched while-loops that (via the disjunction rule Disj) consider
both the case in which both loops terminate immediately (ensuring x = 0) and
the case in which both execute just once (ensuring x > 0). Taking the disjunction
gives the post-relation for the loops that x ≥ 0 in both states, which is of course
the pre-relation for the following if-statement. The rule of consequence allows
this pre-relation to be strengthened to x = 2000000 in both states, from which a
derived rule (omitted) for matching if-statements is applied that explores both
then-branches, observing the insecurity.
The rightmost example of Fig. 2 makes full use of the rule Back-Var-
Matched. This rule is applied first with the backwards-variant relation R(n)
instantiated to require that in both states x = n and 0 ≤ x < 2000000. This
effectively reasons over both loops up to the critical iteration in which x will
be incremented to become 2000000. At this point, we apply a derived rule for
matching while loops similar to WhileTrue that unfolds both for one iteration.
This allows witnessing the insecurity. We then need to reason over the remainder
of the loops to reach the termination of both executions. This is done using the
Back-Var-Matched2 rule, with R(n) instantiated this time to require that in
both states x = 2000000 + n and 2000000 ≤ x ≤ 4000000 and, critically, that
low = high in both states (ensuring that the security violation is not undone
during these subsequent iterations).
6 Related Work
Over-approximate relational logics have been well-studied. Indeed recent work
purports to generalise many previous and forthcoming relational logics [12]. Our
logic is different from these prior relational logics in that those were all over-
approximate. Ours, on the other hand, is an under-approximate logic [16,8].
Thus, while traditional logics aim to provably establish when relational proper-
ties hold, ours aims instead for provably demonstrating violations of relational
properties.
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The power of under-approximate logics for provably detecting bugs was re-
cently explained by O’Hearn [16]. He extended the previous Reverse Hoare Logic
of de Vries and Koutavas [8], so that the semantics explicitly tracks erroneous ex-
ecutions, allowing post-conditions to distinguish between normal and erroneous
execution, producing an Incorrectness Logic.
The semantics of our language, IMP, like that of de Vries and Koutavas does
not explicitly track erroneous execution. Doing so offers less benefit for the pur-
poses of relational reasoning, where erroneous behaviour cannot be characterised
by individual executions but rather only by comparing two executions.
Just as our relational logic can be seen as the relational analogue of prior
under-approximate Hoare logics, our decomposition result (Section 4) can also
be seen as the relational analogue of Beringer’s decomposition result for over-
approximate relational logic [6].
7 Conclusion
We presented the first under-approximate relational logic, for the simple im-
perative language IMP. Our logic is sound and complete. We also showed a
decomposition principle allowing under-approximate relational logic assertions
to be proved via under-approximate Hoare logic reasoning. We briefly discussed
our logic’s application to some small examples, for provably demonstrating the
presence of insecurity. Being a general relational logic, it should be equally ap-
plicable for provably demonstrating violations of other relational properties too.
O’Hearn’s Incorrectness Logic [16] is an under-approximate Hoare logic that
was very recently extended to produce the first Incorrectness Separation Logic [17].
Over-approximate relational separation logics have been studied [19,10] and an
interesting direction for future research would include investigation of under-
approximate relational separation logics. Others naturally include the use of
under-approximate Hoare logic reasoning tools for under-approximate relational
verification. We hope that this paper serves as a step towards automatic, prov-
able detection of relational incorrectness.
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